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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Terence Pak Sing Tsui appeals from the judgment entered upon his
conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine.

Tsui claims the

district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
The state charged Tsui with possession of methamphetamine, possession
of marijuana, and possession of paraphernalia. (R., pp.8-9, 16-17, 22-23.) Tsui
filed a motion to suppress, claiming he was illegally searched. (R., pp.41-45.)
The court held a hearing after which it denied Tsui’s suppression motion. (See
generally Supp. Hrg. Tr.) Tsui thereafter entered a conditional guilty plea to
possession of methamphetamine, reserving his right to appeal the court’s denial
of his motion to suppress, and the state agreed to dismiss the two misdemeanor
charges. (R., pp.69-77; see generally 11/12/2015 Tr.) The court imposed a
unified five-year sentence, with one year fixed, but suspended the sentence and
placed Tsui on probation. (R., pp.88-90.) Tsui filed a timely notice of appeal.
(R., pp.101-102.)

1

ISSUE
Tsui states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Tsui’s motion to
suppress?
(Appellant’s Brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Tsui failed to establish the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress?
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ARGUMENT
Tsui Has Failed To Establish Error In The Denial Of His Suppression Motion
A.

Introduction
Tsui contends the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.

(Appellant’s Brief, pp.5-13.) Specifically, Tsui asserts the district court erred in
concluding the frisk of Tsui was legally justified and in concluding that the
discovery of marijuana that led to Tsui’s arrest (and later discovery of
methamphetamine and paraphernalia) was not the result of the frisk. (Appellant’s
Brief, pp.5-13.) Tsui’s claims fail. The district court correctly concluded that Tsui
was not entitled to suppression based on an allegedly unlawful pat search since
the discovery of contraband was not the result of the frisk. Alternatively, Tsui has
failed to show error in the district court’s conclusion that the frisk was lawful.
B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a

decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the
trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts.

State v.

Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006). The power to assess
the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw
factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho
102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552, 555, 989
P.2d 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1999).
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C.

The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In Denying
Tsui’s Motion To Suppress
“There is no reasonable expectation of privacy from lawfully positioned

agents with inquisitive nostrils.” State v. Rigoulot, 123 Idaho 267, 273, 846 P.2d
918, 924 (Ct. App. 1992) (quotations and citations omitted). Thus, “no search in
the Fourth Amendment sense occurs when an officer, lawfully present at a
certain place, detects odors emanating from a private premises.” Id. at 272-273,
846 P.2d at 923-924.
Officer Martinez encountered Tsui when he and another parole officer
were performing a parole check at Robert Dickson’s residence. (See Supp. Hrg.
Tr., p.7, L.3 – p.10, L.20.) As Officer Martinez “got close” to Tsui, he could smell
a “pretty strong” odor of marijuana.

(Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.25, Ls.8-14.) Officer

Martinez further explained that as he was “pat searching [Tsui’s] torso and as
[he] moved down his torso, [he] could smell marijuana pretty strong.” (Supp. Hrg.
Tr., p.25, Ls.18-20.) Officer Martinez asked Tsui “if he had marijuana on him,”
and Tsui answered, “Yes.” (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.25, L.25 – p.26, L.1.) Officer
Martinez then asked Tsui “if he would show it to [him] and [Tsui] retrieved the bag
out of his pocket.” (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.26, Ls.2-4.) Based on this evidence, the
district court concluded the marijuana in Tsui’s pocket was not discovered “from
the pat search,” but was the result of what Officer Martinez could smell followed
by Tsui’s consensual act of giving Officer Martinez the marijuana. (Supp. Hrg.
Tr., p.34, L.3 – p.35, L.1.) The district court further found the methamphetamine
was lawfully discovered pursuant to a search incident to arrest. (Supp. Hrg. Tr.,
p.35, Ls.3-7.)
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On appeal, Tsui claims the district court’s conclusion was incorrect
because, he argues, the state did not meet its burden of proving Officer Martinez
would have inevitably discovered the marijuana without the frisk, which Tsui
contends was unlawful. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.11-12.) Tsui’s claim fails legally
and factually.
“The inevitable discovery doctrine applies when a preponderance of the
evidence demonstrates that the information would have inevitably been
discovered by lawful methods.” State v. Bunting, 142 Idaho 908, 915, 136 P.3d
379, 386 (Ct. App. 2006) (citations omitted). The inevitable discovery doctrine
has no application in this case because the marijuana in Tsui’s possession was
discovered by a lawful method in the first instance, i.e., pursuant to plain smell
and Tsui’s consensual act of giving Officer Martinez the marijuana,1 and the
methamphetamine and paraphernalia in Tsui’s possession was lawfully
discovered pursuant to a search incident to arrest. State v. LaMay, 140 Idaho
835, 838, 103 P.3d 448, 451 (2004) (citations omitted) (“Searches incident to
arrest are one of the well-established exceptions to the warrant requirement.”).
Thus, contrary to Tsui’s assertion on appeal, this Court need not consider the
inevitable discovery doctrine.
Tsui’s factual assertion that Officer Martinez did not or could not smell the
marijuana on Tsui but for the frisk is unwarranted.

Officer Martinez initially

explained that, as he got close to Tsui, he detected a “pretty strong” smell of
1

Tsui has not claimed below or on appeal that his act of giving Officer Martinez
his marijuana was not consensual; he only claims that it was discovered as the
result of an illegal pat search. (See R. pp.41-45; Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.15, L.5 – p.16,
L.11, p.17, Ls.16-23, p.29, L.22 – p.30, L.6; Appellant’s Brief, pp.5-13.)
5

marijuana. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.25, Ls.10-14.) Officer Martinez’s discussion of that
odor relative to Tsui’s torso was in response to a specific question about the
“sequence” of the smell in relation to the pat search. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.25,
Ls.15-20.) That elaboration does not negate Officer Martinez’s initial indication
that he could smell the odor of marijuana as he got close to Tsui. Even if Officer
Martinez would not have smelled the marijuana without frisking Tsui, Tsui has
failed to show error in the district court’s determination that the frisk was valid.
Under the Fourth Amendment, it is constitutionally permissible for “an
officer to conduct a limited self-protective pat down search of a detainee in order
to remove any weapons.” State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 660, 152 P.3d 16, 21
(2007) (citing State v. Wright, 134 Idaho 79, 82, 996 P.2d 298, 301 (2000)).
Such searches are “evaluated in light of the facts known to the officers on the
scene and the inference of the risk of danger reasonably drawn from the totality
of the circumstances.” Henage, 143 Idaho at 660, 152 P.3d at 21 (quotations
and citation omitted). The ultimate inquiry is an objective one, which requires the
court to consider whether the facts available to the officer would “warrant a man
of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.” Id.
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968)).

“Several factors influence

whether a reasonable person in the officer’s position would conclude that a
particular person was armed and dangerous.” State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804,
819, 203 P.3d 1203, 1218 (2009). The factors include whether: (1) “there were
any bulges in the suspect’s clothing that resembled a weapon”; (2) “the
encounter took place at night or in a high crime area”; (3) “the individual made
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threatening or furtive movements”; (4) “the individual indicated that he or she
possessed a weapon”; (5) “the individual appeared to be under the influence of
alcohol or illegal drugs”; (6) the individual “was unwilling to cooperate”; and (7)
the individual “had a reputation for dangerousness.”

Id. (citations omitted).

“Whether any of these circumstances, taken together or by themselves, are
enough to justify a [pat] frisk depends on an analysis of the totality of the
circumstances.” Id.
With respect to the circumstances surrounding the frisk of Tsui, the district
court found that “around 11:00 p.m. parole officers Pino and Eli Martinez visited
the residence of parolee, Mr. Dickson, who at the time was under felony
supervision. [Tsui] was present at the residence at the time of the probation
officers’ visit.” (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.30, Ls.8-13.) When the parole officers entered
the residence, Dickson was upstairs with Tsui. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.10, Ls.7-20.)
Dickson came downstairs first and Officer Martinez asked him if anyone else was
upstairs; Dickson indicated “he had a friend up there.” (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.10,
Ls.7-16.) “[A] short time later, [Tsui] started coming down the stairs,” with his
hands in his sweatshirt pocket. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.10, Ls.19-20, p.24, Ls.14-17.)
Officer Martinez asked Tsui if he had any weapons, which Tsui denied, but Tsui
was “nervous, didn’t make much eye contact, [and] kept scanning the room when
he got down to the bottom of the stairs.” (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.10, L.24 – p.11, L.5,
p.22, Ls.10-15.) Officer Martinez also noted that, prior to entering the residence,
they encountered a man sitting in a car outside Dickson’s house who said he was
“waiting for a friend” who lived across the street. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.19, L.25 –
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p.20, L.6.) That individual also did not “want[ ] to make much eye contact” with
the officers. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.20, Ls.10-12.) Due to safety concerns, Officer
Martinez told Tsui he was going to pat search him for weapons, and did so, but
he did not remove anything from Tsui’s pockets. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.11, L.6 –
p.12, L.14, p.23, L.19 – p.25, L.9.) Based on the evidence presented, the district
court concluded:
In this case, under the circumstances within which the
officers entered the residence, under the way that the defendant
presented to the officers and after the parolee came downstairs, I
do find that there was reason to believe or to suspect that Mr. Tsui
may have been armed and then a pat search was reasonable
under those circumstances.
(Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.33, L.20 – p.34, L.2.)
On appeal, Tsui first complains “it is not clear what ‘circumstances’ the
district court is referring to with respect to the officers’ entry into Mr. Dixon’s
residence” since there was no evidence of Dixon’s “criminal history” or evidence
that his residence “was or had been a place of known criminal activity.”
(Appellant’s Brief, p.7.) Obviously the district court was not referring to Dixon’s
“criminal history” or evidence of “criminal activity” at Dixon’s house in referencing
the circumstances surrounding the officers’ entry into his home since no such
evidence was presented; rather, the court was referring to the evidence actually
presented, which included the individual the officers encountered outside Dixon’s
house and the delay in Tsui coming downstairs after the officers entered the
residence. Tsui’s confusion on this point does not demonstrate error.
Tsui next notes the lack of any evidence that Tsui “had a bulge in his
pocket that resembled a weapon, made any threatening or furtive movements,
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appeared to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or was unwilling to
cooperate with the officers in any way,” which are factors that are relevant to
whether there was reasonable suspicion to believe he was armed and
dangerous. (Appellant’s Brief, p.7.) While Tsui is correct that there was no
evidence of any of these factors, this combination of factors is not necessarily
required in order to justify a frisk. Although the Court in Bishop indicated the
foregoing factors “influence whether a reasonable person in the officer’s position
would conclude that a particular person was armed and dangerous,” it did not
foreclose the consideration of other factors that could also influence a reasonable
person’s assessment of the situation. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 819, 203 P.3d at
1218; State v. Crooks, 150 Idaho 117, 121, 244 P.3d 261, 265 (Ct. App. 2010)
(“Notably, the Bishop Court did not indicate that its list of factors to consider in
determining the reasonableness of a belief that a suspect is armed and
dangerous was exhaustive.”). Ultimately, a frisk is constitutional so long as the
officer can “demonstrate how the facts he or she relied on in conducting the frisk
support the conclusion that the suspect posed a risk of danger.” Id. (citations
omitted).

In Tsui’s case, the district court focused on other relevant

considerations, which included “the way [Tsui] presented to the officers” after
Dixon had already come downstairs. Tsui initially had his hands in his sweatshirt
pocket, was nervous, and was “scanning” the room. Based on these facts, the
district court found it was reasonable for Officer Martinez to conclude that Tsui
posed a risk of danger and, as such, a frisk was warranted.
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Tsui’s comparison of the facts of his case to State v. Henage, 143 Idaho
655, 152 P.3d 16 (2007), is not persuasive.

(Appellant’s Brief, pp.8-9.)

In

Henage, the Court found the officer lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to
frisk because the officer testified he knew Henage from prior encounters, had
always known him to be “polite” and “cooperative,” which was consistent with
Henage’s behavior during the particular encounter at issue, and that, although
Henage told the officer he had a knife on him, the officer returned the knife,
which was a Leatherman, to Henage after being made aware of its presence. Id.
at 661-662, 22-23. Unlike in Henage, Officer Martinez had no such experience
with Tsui, and the circumstances surrounding the encounter, which included
being inside the home of a felony parolee where others were present, were
reasonably perceived as posing a risk of danger.
Tsui has failed to establish any error in the denial of his suppression
motion.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Tsui’s conviction for
possession of methamphetamine.
DATED this 14th day of July 14, 2016.

_/s/ Jessica M. Lorello__
JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General

10

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 14th day of July, 2016, served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an
electronic copy to:
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

JML/dd

_/s/ Jessica M. Lorello__
JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General
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